




Suppose we know the utility function of a risk averse decision maker
who values a risky prospect X at a price CE. Based on this infor-
mation alone I develop upper bounds for the tails of the probabilis-
tic belief about X of the decision maker. I also illustrate how to use
these expected utility bounds in a variety of applications, which include
the estimation of risk measures from observed data, option valuation,
credit risk and the equity premium puzzle.
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Suppose we know the utility function of a risk averse decision maker who
values a risky prospect X at a price CE. Based on this very limited informa-
tion, can we know anything whatsoever about the beliefs held by the decision
maker about X?
The surprising answer is that we can, and the reason is that CE cannot
be too high if the decision maker believes with high probability that the risky
prospect will perform extremely poorly. Similarly, the CE cannot be too low
if the decision maker believes with high probability that the risky prospect
will perform extremely well. The main result of this paper is an upper bound
for the tails of the probabilistic belief of an expected utility decision maker;
bounds that depend on the utility function and on CE, but that do not
depend on assumptions made on the shape of the probability distribution
that describes the beliefs of the decision maker.
In the paper I also explore applications of these expected utility bounds to
a variety of economic problems, which include the estimation of risk measures
from observed data, the valuation of options, the analysis of credit risk and
the equity premium puzzle.
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2 The Setup
Consider a risky prospect X that takes values in a set of possible outcomes
C  R. The decision maker is risk averse and has preferences over risky
prospects given by an increasing and continuous (Bernoulli) utility function
u : C ! R; known to the analyst, and by some probability distribution
function P over the (measurable) subsets of C. This probability distribution
is unknown to the analyst.
Suppose that, in addition, the analyst observes that the decision makers
certainty equivalent for X is equal to CE. The main goal of this paper is
to see if we can recover some useful information about P from the fact that
X is dened over C, the decision maker has utility function u and values the
risky prospect at CE.
Without loss of generality, I normalize the origin and units of u in such a
way that u := supx2C u (x) = 0; when an upper bound for u exists on C, and
u := infx2C u (x) =  1; when a lower bound for u exists on C.1
Throughout the paper all random variables will be denoted by bold let-
ters.
1To be sure, given any increasing and continuous utility function v with upper and
lower bound on C given respectively by v and v, dene u by u (x) = v(x) v(v v) : It can be
checked that u (x)  0 for all x and u =  1 as desired.
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3 The Result
The main results of the paper is the following.
Theorem 1 Suppose X is a risky prospect valued at CE by a decision maker
with utility function u. Then, for k > 0,
(i) If u = 0;
P (X  CE   k)  u (CE)
u (CE   k) ; and
(ii) If u =  1;
P (X  CE + k)  u (CE) + 1
u (CE + k) + 1
:
Proof. Let sk = sup fu (x) : x  CE   kg : Since u is increasing, sk =
u (CE   k) : The denition of sk and the fact that u (x)  0 for all x 2 C
imply that
u (CE   k) 1fXCE kg  u (X) 1fXCE kg  u (X) :
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Now take expected values to obtain
u (CE   k) P (X  CE   k)  Eu (X) :
By the denition of the certainty equivalent CE of a risky prospect, Eu (X) =
u (CE) : Using this fact and rearranging yields (i).
To prove (ii) let ik = inf fu (x) : x  CE + kg : Since u is increasing,
ik = u (CE + k) : The denition of ik and the fact that u (x)   1 for all
x 2 C imply that
u (X)  u (CE + k) 1fXCE+kg + ( 1) 1fXCE+kg:
Now take expected values to obtain
Eu (X) = u (CE)  u (CE + k) P (X  CE + k)  [1  P (X  CE + k)] :
Rearranging this expression yields (ii).
Remark 1 An upper bound for u arises naturally, no matter the shape of
C, if u is bounded from above, as with constant absolute risk aversion prefer-
ences. Alternatively, an upper (resp. lower) bound for u arises, no matter the
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shape of u, if C is bounded above (resp. below), as in Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970, 1971). I use both kinds of assumptions in the applications developed
below.
Remark 2 The reader may notice that the proof of this result works in the
same way of that for Chebyshevs inequality, an inequality that provides esti-
mates of the tail of a probability distribution based solely on estimates of its
mean and standard deviation. There is a sense in which the theorem above
provides an estimate of the lower tail of the distribution in the same way,
but by using information about economically meaningful variables, such as
CE and u, rather than mainly statistical measures such as the mean and the
standard deviation of X.
The application in the next section makes this interpretive point more
precise.
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4 An unexpected use for the coe¢ cient of
risk tolerance
Consider a decision maker with preferences given by a Bernoulli utility func-
tion that satises constant absolute risk aversion, that is,
u (x) =  e xr ;
for r > 0. The parameter r in this formulation measures the decision makers
tolerance for risk. The following facts are standard: (i) As r decreases, the
individual becomes more more risk averse, (ii) as r approaches innity, the
individual tends towards risk neutral behavior, (iii) the coe¢ cient of absolute
risk aversion for this decision maker is given by 1=r:
It turns out that the following is true: An individual with a constant risk
tolerance of r that values a risky prospect X at a price CE cannot assign
probability greater than 14% to X taking values less than 2r to the left of
CE. That is, for this decision maker, P (X  CE   2r)  14%, an estimate
made without making any assumptions about the shape of the distribution
of X.
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To see how this is true simply notice that the utility function being con-
sidered is bounded above by zero and hence, by Theorem 1
P (X  CE   k)  eCE k CEr = e  kr :
Replacing k with zr yields P (X  CE   zr)  e z; and setting z = 2 gives
the desired result, as e 2  14%. This simple fact is summarized in the
theorem below.
Theorem 2 Suppose X is a risky prospect valued at CE by a decision maker
with constant risk tolerance parameter given by r. Then
P (X  CE   zr)  e z (1)
Remark 3 It is instructive to compare this estimate with the one given by
the one-sided Chebyshevs inequality
P (X    z)  1
1 + z2
;
where  and  are, respectively, the mean and the standard deviation of X
for this decision maker. Notice that z = 2 this gives an upper bound for
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P (X    2) of 20%, an estimate made without making any assumptions
about the shape of the distribution of X.
One can say that, based on the above, there is a precise sense in which,
for the purpose of coming up with upper bound estimates of the lower tail
of the distribution of beliefs of the decision maker, the certainty equivalent
is to the mean of the belief distribution as the risk tolerance coe¢ cient is to
the standard deviation of the belief distribution.
5 Value at Risk
Value at risk is a measure used to estimate how the value of an asset or of
a portfolio of assets could decrease over a certain time period under usual
conditions. Usual conditions in this context is dened to mean under most
circumstances, which in turn is described with respect to a probabilistic
condence level, usually 95% or 99%.
Formally, the Value at Risk at a condence level of p; of a risky prospect
X worth CE to a decision maker is the maximum loss L that the decision
maker expects to incur with probability p. It can be calculated by the fol-
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lowing formula:
CE   (1  p)th percentile of X:
It turns out that the following is true:
Theorem 3 Suppose X is a risky prospect valued at CE by a decision maker
with invertible utility function u with u = 0. Then the Value at Risk, L, at a
condence level of p for this decision maker must satisfy






Proof. From Theorem 1 and from the fact that u (CE   L) < 0 it follows
that
u (CE   L)  u (CE)
P (X  CE   L) :
Since u is increasing and invertible, and setting P (X  CE   L) = 1   p;
then







which gives a lower bound on the (1  p)th percentile of the distribution of
X according to the decision maker. Rearranging gives the desired result.
Notice that for the case of decision makers with constant risk tolerance r
expression (2) reduces to
L   r ln (1  p)
Example 1 Suppose X is a risky prospect valued at 100 by a decision maker
with constant risk tolerance parameter given by r = 10. Then an analyst that
knows this about the decision maker will know that the Value at Risk at a
condence level of 95% for the decision maker will be below 30. That is, the
analyst will know that the decision maker considers his losses to be below a
certain threshold with probability 95% ; this threshold the analyst knows will
be below 30.
6 Variance and Half-Variance Bounds
It is standard in many applications to use the variance 2 of a risky propect
X as a way to measure its riskiness. One potential drawback to this method
is that it is not always easy for an analyst to adequately estimate the variance
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of X that is implicit in the probabilistic beliefs of the decision maker.2 In
this Section I develop upper and lower bounds for 2 that depend on the
decision makers attitudes towards risk, on the certainty equivalent of the
risky prospect, and on its risk premium.
Consider the case of a decision maker who values some asset at CE. The
following is standard: if we know the expected value of the asset, ; and
 CE > 0; then (a) the asset is risky (otherwise  CE = 0), and (b) the
decision maker is risk averse (otherwise   CE  0): Because of this, label
the asset as X (as a risky prospect) and call  CE the risk premium of X.
In this Section I establish, in addition, the following: if we know the
value of the asset for the decision maker, the risk premium and the decision
makers attitudes towards risk, then it follows that the variance of X cannot
be too small (resp. too big) or we would observe a smaller (resp. bigger) risk
premium. The details follow.
Theorem 4 Suppose X is a risky prospect valued at CE and with risk pre-
mium given by RP for a decision maker with utility function u; with u =  1.
2See, e.g., the discussion in Morgan and Henrion (1990). See also Myerson (2005).
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1  u (CE) + 1
u (CE + k) + 1

> 0 (3)
Proof. With  = RP + CE notice that, for k < RP ,
inf

(X )2 : X  CE + k	 = (RP   k)2 ;
and hence
(X )2 = (X )2 1fXCE+kg + (X )2 1fXCE+kg
 (RP   k)2 1fXCE+kg:
Taking expectations yields
2  (RP   k)2 (1  P (X  CE + k)) :
From Theorem 1,
1  P (X  CE + k) 

1  u (CE) + 1




2  (RP   k)2

1  u (CE) + 1
u (CE + k) + 1







1  u (CE) + 1
u (CE + k) + 1

;
which is greater than zero since the function to be maximized is continuous,
non-negative, and takes strictly positive values in the interior of [0; RP ] :
Remark 4 Another commonly used measure of risk is the half variance,
dened as HV = E
 
min fX  ; 0g2 : The half variance takes into account
only the so-called downside risk. It is not hard to see that the bound in
expression (3) is also a lower bound for the half variance of X. I ommit the
details here.
Example 2 Consider a decision maker with constant relative risk aversion
preferences, with coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion equal to 1=2. Assume
the decision maker is evaluating a risky prospect X that can take only non-
negative values. If this decision maker values X at 100 and believes the risk
premium of this prospect to be 20 then the standard deviation of X according
to this decision maker is at least 2:38.
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For the next result in this Section it is necessary for C to be bounded. Let
a and b be the greatest lower bound and least upper bound of C, respectively,
with associated lower and upper bounds of u on C given by u =  1 and
u = 0: Call a risky prospect X dened over such set C a bounded project.
If X is a bounded project, let b    be the upside potential of X and d =
min fb  ;   ag be the narrow range of X.
Theorem 5 Suppose X is a bounded project valued at CE and with risk
premium given by RP for a decision maker with utility function u: Assume
further that the risk premium does not exceed the upside potential of X. Then
the variance 2 of X for this decision maker satises
2  (a  )2   d2 u (CE)
u (  d) +

(b  )2   d2 u (CE) + 1
u (+ d) + 1
+ d2
Proof. With  = RP + CE notice that, for k < d,
(X )2 = (X )2 1fX kg + (X )2 1f kX+kg + (X )2 1fX+kg
 (a  )2 1fX kg + k21f kX+kg + (b )2 1fX+kg
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Taking expectations and rearranging yields
2  (a  )2   k2P (X    k) + (b )2   k2P (X  + k) + k2:
To replace the probabilities with their upper estimates from Theorem 1 we
require that k > RP . This is possible, since, by assumption, the risk premium
does not exceed the upside potential of X, and this guarantees that RP < d:
Then
2  (a  )2   k2 u (CE)
u (  k) +

(b  )2   k2 u (CE) + 1
u (+ k) + 1
+ k2 (4)
for all k 2 [RP; d]. It turns out that the right hand side of (4) is decreasing in
k (I show this in Appendix 1). Then the best upper bound for the variance
is obtained by replacing d in place of k in (4), which gives the desired result.
Example 3 Consider a decision maker with constant relative risk aversion
preferences, with coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion equal to 6. Assume
the decision maker is evaluating a risky prospect X that can take only non-
negative values not greater than 150. If this decision maker values X at 100
and believes the risk premium of this prospect is equal to 7 then the standard
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deviation of X according to this decision maker is at most 52:5.
7 Option Valuation
Having upper estimates of the probabilities of tail events for a decision maker
can be of use to see how this decision maker would value nancial instruments
whose payo¤s are tied to the occurrence of those events. In short, they can
be of use for the valuation of options and other nancial derivatives.
The ability to use the inequalities developed in the present paper to put
expected utility bounds on option values is potentially very valuable, as
it is known that parametric approaches to the estimation of those tail prob-
abilities tend to produce distributions with tails that are either too thin or
too unstable. Another potential problem is that sometimes we are dealing
with one-of-a-kind projects for which there is not even any previous data to
use in the estimation process.
The use of upper bounds to the probability of those tail events sidesteps
completely the tail estimation problem, as it avoids making distributional
assumptions. This, of course, can come at a cost if one ends up with bounds
to the option values that are not very informative. Whether this is so or not
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is an empirical question that deserves attention in its own right.
What follows illustrates the kinds of bounds on the value of options that
arise from a judicious application of Theorem 1 to the valuation of out-of-
the-money put options.3
The setup is, again, a risky prospect X that takes values in a set of pos-
sible outcomes C: The decision maker evaluates X with an increasing utility
function u and with respect to beliefs given by a distribution P; unknown to
the analyst. All payo¤s and prices in this Section are expressed in present
value terms.
I am interested in how much this decision maker would value a contract
that gives the decision maker the right but not the obligation to sell risky
prospect X at a predetermined (strike) price S. I am thus interested in the
value for the decision maker of the risky prospect
TS = max fS  X; 0g ;
commonly known as a put option on X with strike price S. To nd the value
of TS for the decision maker one has to nd the certainty equivalent of TS;
3A similar exercise done on the valuation of call options produces bounds on the option
values that are worse than well known arbitrage bounds, and it is therefore of little
interest.
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that is, the price QS such that
u (QS) = Eu (TS) :
The following result will be needed in what follows.
Lemma 6 Suppose X is a risky prospect to be valued by a decision maker
with utility function u: Let TS be a put option on X with strike price S. Then
Eu (TS)  u (S)P (X  S) + u (0) [1  P (X  S)] (5)
Proof.
u (TS) = u (max fS  X; 0g) = u (S  X) 1fXSg + u (0) 1fXSg
Since u is increasing, u (S   x)  u (S) ; so
u (TS)  u (S) 1fXSg + u (0) 1fXSg;
and taking expectations yields the desired result.
Even if an analyst knows the utility function of the decision maker equa-
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tion (5) is of little help if one has no information about the beliefs held by
the decision maker. This is where an estimate of P (X  S) can be of help.
Such estimate is available for S < CE; that is, for options that are out of
the money.
In what follows I assume that u is bounded from above and normalize
the origin of u in such a way that u (x)  0 for all x 2 C and the units of the
the utility function in such a way that u (0) =  1:4 Also, let P (X > S) =
1   u(CE)
u(S)
: From Theorem 1 it follows that one can interpret P (X > S) to
be a lower bound on the probability that the decision maker assigns to X
taking values greater than S.
Theorem 7 Suppose X is a risky prospect valued at CE by a decision maker
with utility function u with u = 0 and for which u (0) =  1. Then, for
S < CE,
Eu (TS)  Eu (X)  P (X > S): (6)
Proof. From Lemma 6 we have that
Eu (TS)  u (S)P (X  S) + u (0) [1  P (X  S)] ;
4Notice that I am not assuming in this case that  1 is the lower bound of u on C.
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while Theorem 1 gives us a bound on P (X  S) :
P (X  S)  u (CE)
u (S)
:
Combining these two expressions and rearranging we get









Eu (TS)  Eu (X)  P (X > S):
Expression (6) then reads as follows: the expected utility of holding the
put option cannot exceed the expected utility of holding the original risky
prospect, minus the analysts lower estimate on the probability that the
option will expire worthless.5 This expression can be used to nd an upper
bound to the value of the option, since u (QS) = Eu (TS) and u (CE) =
Eu (X) : I record the formula for obtaining such bound below.
5Of course, discussing expression (6) in this way makes sense specically for the nor-
malization of the utility function chosen above.
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Corollary 8 SupposeX is a risky prospect valued at CE by a decision maker
with invertible utility function u with u = 0 and for which u (0) =  1. Then,









Notice that for the case of decision makers with constant risk tolerance r
expression (7) reduces to








Example 4 Suppose X is a risky prospect valued at 100 by a decision maker
with constant risk tolerance parameter. Table 1 shows upper bounds on the
values of put options of di¤erent strike prices for varying degrees of tolerance
for risk.
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S60 65 70 75 80 85 90
8 0.05 0.1 0.19 0.36 0.69 1.33 2.70
r 10 0.18 0.31 0.51 0.86 1.45 2.52 4.59
15 1.06 1.51 2.16 3.12 4.56 6.85 10.77
Table 1. Upper bound on the price of put options given a strike
price of S and constant risk tolerance r for a risky prospect
worth 100 to the decision maker.
For example, a decision maker with constant risk tolerance coe¢ cient given
by r = 10 that values X at 100 will value a put option on X with strike price
65 at some level that the analyst knows will never be above 0.31. Another
way to put this is as follows: given that the decision maker values X at 100
there is no probabilistic belief that the decision maker could have about X,
no matter how pessimistic it may be, that would justify the analyst believeing
that the decision maker would pay more than 0.31 for this option. In this
sense, the estimates are robust to the tails of the belief distribution being fat
or di¢ cult to estimate.
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8 Credit Risk
The expected utility bounds developed in this paper can be used for esti-
mating the probability that an entity with limited liability will default on its
debt. They can also be used for estimating the value of this debt to some
decision maker.
The setup is one in which there is an entity with limited liability that
owns the proceeds of risky prospect X: The entity has debts by an amount
equal to B > 0 that are due at the moment the value of X is realized. As
before, a decision maker evaluates X with an increasing utility function u
and with respect to beliefs given by a distribution P . The entity and the
decision maker in this setup may be the same, although this is not necessary.
All payo¤s and prices in this Section are expressed in present value terms.
8.1 Default probabilities
The rst result of this Section is an upper bound on the probability that the
entity will default on its debt.
Theorem 9 Suppose X is a risky prospect valued at CE by a decision maker
with utility function u with u = 0: Suppose the entity that owns X has B > 0
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in debts, with B < CE. Then the probability, P d; for this decision maker,
that the entity will default on its debt satises
P d  u (CE)
u (B)
Proof. The entity enters default when the realized value ofX is not su¢ cient
to cover the decision makers obligations, that is, when X < B: Hence, P d =
P (X  B) and an application of Theorem 1 for the case where k = CE B
yields the desired result.
Example 5 Suppose X is a risky prospect valued at 100 by a decision maker
that has a constant risk tolerance parameter given by r = 20. If the entity
that owns X owes 40 to creditors then this decision maker believes that the
entity will default on its debt with probability P d, a probability that the analyst
knows is below 4.98%.
8.2 The Value of Risky Debt
Due to limited liability, owning a risky prospect X with B in debts is just
like owning a call option on X with strike price B. This fact, together with
the put-call parity, implies that the value of the risky debt equals the value
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of riskless debt of identical face value minus the value of a put option on X
with strike price B, that is,
VB = B  QB; (8)
whereQB is the certainty equivalent for this decision maker ofTB =max fB  X; 0g :
One can therefore nd lower bounds on the value of the risky debt to a par-
ticular decision maker using the results from Section 7.
Theorem 10 Suppose X is a risky prospect valued at CE by a decision
maker with invertible utility function u with u = 0 and for which u (0) =  1.
If the entity that owns X has debts given by B < CE then the decision maker
values this debt by an amount VB that satises








Proof. Combine equation (7) ; with strike price equal to B; and equation
(8) to get the desired result.
Example 6 Suppose X is a risky prospect valued at 100 by a decision maker
that has a constant risk tolerance parameter given by r = 30. If the entity
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that owns X also owes 40 to creditors then this decision maker values this
debt at a level VB; a level that the analyst knows is above 36.9.
9 The Equity Premium Puzzle
In an economy populated with risk averse investors the return on stocks must
exceed that of riskless bonds to compensate investors for the risk they bear
when holding the stocks. The equity premium puzzle, simply stated, is the
fact that the excess return of stocks over bonds in the data is much larger
than predicted by the standard consumption based asset pricing model under
most reasonable assumptions about the investorsattitudes towards risk.
As this is not a paper about asset pricing I will not go into developing
the full details of the consumption based model here.6 I will instead focus on
explaining how inequalities like the ones developed above can shed light on
whether assuming that the representative investor has probabilistic beliefs
over the stock returns with a fat left tailcould account for at least part of
the puzzle.
6For an excellent treatment of the relevant literature see, for example, Cochrane
(2005a). I follow his presentation of the equity premium puzzle below.
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9.1 The Puzzle
The starting point is the basic pricing equation in a consumption based
model: that asset prices are generated by expected discounted payo¤s,
p = E (mx) ; (9)
where x is the random payo¤ of some asset, m is a stochastic discount factor
and p is the price of the asset: As this equation must hold for all assets, in
particular it holds for the gross asset returns R = x=p; and for the gross risk
free asset return Rf , and therefore
1 = E (mR) ; (10)
and 1 = E (m)Rf : (11)
By denition, E (mR) = E (m)E (R) +  (m) (R) m;R; where m;R is
the correlation coe¢ cient between m and R. Then equation (10) becomes,








The equity premium puzzle can be expressed using expression (12) as fol-
lows:7 according to postwar US data E (R)  1:09; E (m) 1 = Rf  1:01
and  (R)  16%; which, using expression (12), translates into  (m)  50%
on an annual basis.
To see the problem with such high discount factor volatility consider that
time separable utility and constant relative risk aversion preferences implies
that
 (m) =E (m) =  (c) ; (13)
where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of the representa-
tive investor and c is aggregate consumption growth. With the consump-
tion growth volatility of about 1:5% per year observed in US postwar data,
this implies that the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion consistent with the
data satises   50%=1:5% = 33; which is a level that seems much larger
than most economists nd acceptable.
A huge literature has developed that attempts to expand and/or explain
this puzzle. In the rest of this Section I build an argument based on the
inequalities developed above that attempts to shed light on whether belief
7The facts presented below are standard and they can be found, for example, in
Cochrane (2005b).
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distributions of returns with a fat left tail could account for at least part of
the puzzle.
9.2 Part of the solution?
One possibility for reconciling expression (12) with the data stems from the
recognition that (12) involves expectations of random variables, and those
expectations are to be computed with respect to the probabilistic beliefs of
the representative investor. Notice, however, that the computations used in
the literature to illustrate the puzzle replace those expectations with histor-
ical sample moments of the variables of interest. It is therefore plausible
that part of the problem is that we are bringing the wrong magnitudes into
expression (12).8
In this Section I adopt the perspective that, in particular, the problem is
most severe with regards to the standard deviation of returns. Put simply, the
representative investor may believe that the stock market is much riskier than
implied by a standard deviation of 16% but such perceived riskiness need not
be reected in the data, as the tails of the empirical distribution of returns
may understate the thicknessof the left tail of the belief distribution of the
8In this sense the present Section adopts a perspective similar to that of Weitzman
(2005), Barro (2005) and Rietz (1988).
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representative investor. Put simply, the representative investor may believe
that stock market crashes are far more common than the data suggests,
and hence require a high premium as compensation for holding stocks. The
following question arises: how likely do very negative returns have to be to
the representative investor for the observed equity premium to be consistent
with expression (12) under reasonablelevels of risk aversion?
Below I show how bounds like the ones developed earlier in this paper
may be of help to address this question. I rst nd an upper bound to the
right tail of the belief distribution over the returns of any asset, given that
we know the investors expected return for the asset. This last bound, jointly
with expression (12), and a "reasonable" value for the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion, are su¢ cient to produce a lower bound on the probability that
the risky assets perform extremely poorly.
9.3 The probability of very poor returns
Consider a decision maker that estimates the expected gross return for a
risky asset to be equal to E(R). Those returns may or may not be bounded
according to the decision maker. Let a and b be the greatest lower bound
and least upper bound for R, according to the decision maker, when they
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exist.
Theorem 11 Assume the expected gross return for a risky asset is equal to
E(R) for some decision maker: Then, for k > 0,
(i) If R is bounded above by b;
P (R  E (R)  k)  b  E (R)
b  E (R) + k ; and
(ii) If R is bounded below by a;
P (R  E (R) + k)  E (R)  a
E (R)  a+ k :
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. I present the details
in Appendix 2.
Now suppose for a moment that a lower bound to the standard deviation
of returns for the decision maker is known. This, in combination with The-
orem 11, is su¢ cient information for the derivation of a lower bound to the
probability of R taking values substantially below E (R).
Theorem 12 Assume the expected gross return for a risky asset is equal to
E(R) according to some decision maker. Assume that to this decision maker
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the returns are bounded below and above by a and b, respectively, and that
the variance 2 of R for this decision maker is bounded below by z.Then, for
k 2 (0; E (R)  a)
P (R  E (R)  k) 
z   (b  E (R))2   k2 E(R) a
E(R) a+k   k2
(a  E (R))2   k2
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5. I present the details
in Appendix 3.
9.4 Example
The example illustrates how to use the bounds developed above to answer the
following: How likely do very negative returns have to be to the representative
investor for the observed equity premium to be consistent with expression
(12) under reasonablelevels of risk aversion?
Assume that   5 is the upper bound on the level of relative risk aversion
that is considered reasonablefor the representative investor in a standard
consumption-based asset pricing model with constant relative risk aversion
preferences, such as the one described at the beginning of this Section. Plug-
ging this number into expression (13) with a consumption growth volatility
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of 1:5% and Rf  1:01 implies that  (m)  7:43% on an annual basis.
From this information, expression (12) and an expected gross return for
the risky asset given by E (R)  1:09; as in the historical data, it follows that
the the standard deviation of returns for the representative investor that is
consistent with the observed premium satises





in other words, it would have to be at least 107% in annual terms. This makes
sense only if the representative investor puts su¢ ciently high probability
on returns being either extremely positive or extremely negative. Is this a
sensible conclusion to believe?
To shed light on this issue assume that according to the representative
investor the gross return for the risky asset is never above 2E (R) = 2:18 in
any given year although it can be as low as zero. These are very, very ample
bounds.9 Then, by Theorem 12, the probability of the risky asset performing
9For comparison, the maximum and minimum gross returns of the S&P composite
index over the period 1873-2004 were 1.46 and 0.54 respectively.
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very poorly satises





which has to be satised for all k 2 (0; 1:09) : This inequality is most de-
manding for k t :82; point at which
P (R  1:09  :82) = P (R  :27)  33%:
The implication is that the representative investor has to believe that net
returns of  73% per year or worse may occur with probability of at least
1=3 for the observed equity premium to be consistent with expression (12)
if the representative investor has a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion that is
no greater than 5 and is convinced that the risky asset never yields annual
net returns above 118%.
The assumptions made here are not restrictive at all, use inequalities that,
by design, provide ample bounds in general, yet they require the represen-
tative investor to assign a quite sizable probability to very poor returns. In
that sense, belief distributions of returns would have to have an extremely
fat left tail for them to be able to explain, by themselves, the equity premium
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puzzle.
To be sure, this is not meant to be a denitive answer on the issue.
Rather, the point of this Section has simply been to illustrate the applicability
of the bounds espoused in this paper to a well-known problem in nancial
economics; to show that they could be useful tools in the elucidation of an
answer to this puzzle.
10 Conclusions
In this paper I developed expected utility bounds to the tails of the proba-
bilistic beliefs of a risk averse decision maker over a risky prospect based on
economic magnitudes such as the certainty equivalent and the risk premium
of the risky prospect, and on the decision makers attitudes towards risk. I
also developed applications of these expected utility bounds to several eco-
nomic problems, such as the estimation of risk measures, option valuation,
credit risk and the equity premium puzzle. The bounds are very general in
that they require virtually no knowledge about the functional form of the
probabilistic beliefs of the decision maker.
As shown in the applications, the bounds can be used in one of two ways:
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(i) to generate estimates of certain unobservable variables, based on what is
observable, and (ii) as an intermediate step in a more elaborate theoretical
argument. Consequently, they should be of interest to both theoretical and
empirical researchers alike.
Appendix 1
I wish to show that
(a  )2 u (CE)
u (  k)+(b )
2 u (CE) + 1




u (  k)  
u (CE) + 1
u (+ k) + 1

is strictly decreasing in k. Let A = (a  )2 ; B = (b )2 ; f (k) = u(CE)
u( k) ;
g (k) = u(CE)+1
u(+k)+1
and h (k) = 1 f (k) g (k) : The expression above becomes
Af (k) +Bg (k) + k2h (k) : (14)
It is not hard to see that 0 < f (k) < 1; 0 < g (k) < 1; h (k) < 0; and that
f 0 (k) < 0; g0 (k) < 0; h0 (k) =   (f 0 (k) + g0 (k)) > 0.
The rst derivative of (14) with respect to k is given by
Af 0 (k) +Bg0 (k) + 2k h (k) + k2h0 (k) ;
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or  
A  k2 f 0 (k) +  B   k2 g0 (k) + 2k h (k) : (15)
The fact that every summation term in (15) is negative for k < d completes
the proof.
Appendix 2
Write the gross return as
R = R 1fRE(R) kg +R 1fRE(R) kg
 (E (R)  k) 1fRE(R) kg + b 1fRE(R) kg:
Taking expectations we get
E (R)  (E (R)  k)P (R  E (R)  k) + b [1  P (R  E (R)  k)] :
Rearranging this expression produces expression (i) in Theorem 11.
To show part (ii) of the Theorem notice that
R = R 1fRE(R)+kg +R 1fRE(R)+kg
 a 1fRE(R)+kg + (E (R) + k) 1fRE(R)+kg:
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Taking expectations we get
E (R)  a [1  P (R  E (R) + k)] + (E (R) + k)P (R  E (R) + k) :
Rearranging produces the desired result.
Appendix 3
Notice that, for k < d := min fE (R)  a; b  E (R)g,
(R E (R))2 = (R E (R))2 1fRE(R) kg
+(R E (R))2 1fE(R) kRE(R)+kg
+(R E (R))2 1fRE(R)+kg
 (a  E (R))2 1fRE(R) kg + k21fE(R) kRE(R)+kg
+(b E (R))2 1fRE(R)+kg
Taking expectations and rearranging yields
2  (a  E (R))2   k2P (R  E (R)  k)
+

(b E (R))2   k2P (R  E (R) + k) + k2: (16)
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Replace P (R  E (R) + k) in (16) with its upper bound, as in Theorem 11,
and 2 with its lower bound, z, and get
z  (a  E (R))2   k2P (R  E (R)  k)
+

(b E (R))2   k2 E (R)  a
E (R)  a+ k + k
2: (17)
Solve for P (R  E (R)  k) to get the desired result.
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